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Abstract
This article addresses a gap in the common understanding of corruption. The rules regarding corruption at
both the macro- and the micro-level are well known, as are the consequences at the macro-level. The
consequences at the micro-level, however, particularly for business firms, are not well understood. With
respect to rules, at both the macro-and micro-levels the rules are very clear: do not pay bribes. At the macro-
level the consequences are well known: corruption has devastating effects on societies and economies.
Although not often referred to in most corruption literature, the consequences at the micro-level can be
discussed. This article begins with the direct and indirect costs imposed on firms that pay bribes. Firms that
pay bribes spend more time and money dealing with governments, and bear the costs of distortions of internal
resources. The article then examines the negative effects of corruption on existing relationships within the
firm and potential relationships with parties outside of the firm. Finally, the article examines potential criminal
and civil liability that a firm exposes itself to when it pays bribes. The totality of these costs and liabilities
strongly suggest that the consequences for any given firm of paying a bribe would burden rather than benefit
the firm.
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The Business Case for Complying with Bribery Laws 
 
Philip M. Nichols* 
 
 
International businesspeople report that bribery presents one of the most frequent and perplexing 
issues that they encounter.1  Their confusion regarding corruption might seem disingenuous.  
The past fifteen years have witnessed an explosion of scholarly research on corruption.2  The 
rules on bribery should pose little mystery for an international businessperson faced with a 
decision regarding a bribe.  And yet, in what David Hess and Thomas Dunfee describe as “the 
paradox of corruption,” businesses continue to pay bribes.3  A closer examination of corruption 
research, with an eye toward the guidance that it provides to decision makers, provides some 
insight as to why this paradox persists. 
 From both a macro- and a microdeontological perspective, the rules regarding corruption 
are very clear.  Every major school of thought includes rules against bribery4: the Qur’an, for 
example, proclaims that “Allah loveth not corrupters,”5 while the text shared by Judaism and 
Christianity admonishes “you shall not accept a bribe.”6  Sikh doctrine seeks “righteous rule,” 
* Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.  
This article was supported by a research grant from the Department of Legal Studies and Business Ethics.  Marisa 
Schoen and Jeffrey Johnson provided valuable research assistance for this article. An earlier version of this article 
was selected as a finalist for the 2011 Holmes-Cardozo Award for outstanding scholarship by the Academy of Legal 
Studies in Business. 
1 See James H. Davis & John A. Ruhe, Perceptions of Country Corruption: Antecedents and Outcomes, 43 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 275, 276 (2003) (reporting that the World Bank considers corruption the greatest impediment to global 
commercial relationships); Margaret McNeil & Kerry Pedigo, Western Australian Managers Tell Their Stories: 
Ethical Challenges in International Business Operations, 30 J. BUS. ETHICS 305, 306 (2001) (discussing surveys 
that report that bribe requests are the most frequent ethical problem faced by Australian and U.S. businesspeople). 
2 See, e.g., George T. Abed & Sanjeev Gupta, The Economics of Corruption: An Overview, in GOVERNANCE, 
CORRUPTION, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 1, 1 (George T. Abed & Sanjeev Gupta eds., 2002); Daniel Kaufman, 
Back to Basics—Ten Myths About Governance and Corruption, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 2005, at 41, 41.  As recently as a 
decade ago, scholars noted that research on corruption “is very much in its nascent stage.”  J. Egardo Campos et al., 
Corruption and Its Implications for Investment, in CORRUPTION:  THE BOOM AND BUST OF EAST ASIA 11, 21 (J. 
Edgardo Campos ed., 2001). 
3 David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach; The C2 Principles (Combating 
Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 593, 595 (2000); see also David Hess & Cristie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption 
and Reform Undertakings: A New Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 307, 312–13 (2008) 
(revisiting the paradox of corruption). 
4 Philip M. Nichols, Outlawing Transnational Bribery Through the World Trade Organization, 28 L. & POL’Y INT’L 
BUS. 305, 321–22 (1997). 
5 Sura 28:77 (Muhammad Marmaduke Pickhall trans., 1930); see also Mohammad Saeed et al., International 
Marketing Ethics from an Islamic Perspective: A Value-Maximization Approach, 32 J. BUS. ETHICS 127, 136 (2001) 
(stating that because of a core “regard for the societal welfare . . . Islam condemns bribery unequivocally in all its 
forms whether it represents protecting business interests and/or securing greater profits”). 
6 Deuteronomy 16:19 (English Standard Version); see also Menachem Elon, The Sources and Nature of Jewish Law 
and Its Application in the State of Israel—Part IV, 4 ISR. L. REV. 80, 99 (1969) (stating that the bribery laws of 
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which specifically excludes corruption,7 while the second moral precept of Buddhism “involves 
abstinence from all deceptive practices such as bribery that lead to moral disintegration.”8  Every 
country in the world prohibits bribery.9  The normative and legal rules coincide and could not be 
more clear10: do not pay bribes, even in an international context. 
 Social contracts also tell the local and transnational businessperson not to pay bribes.  
Thomas Donaldson and Thomas Dunfee, two leading social contract theorists, propose an 
Integrative Social Contract Theory that includes very general macrosocial contracts but leaves 
open most moral space for the generation of microsocial contracts by local communities.11  Both 
macrosocial and microsocial contracts, however, must comport with incontestable, nonnegotiated 
norms to which Donaldson and Dunfee give the appellation “hypernorms”:  “a thin universal 
morality . . . principles so fundamental that, by definition, they serve to evaluate low-order norms 
. . . reaching to the root of what is ethical for humanity.”12  Donaldson and Dunfee suggest that 
bribery violates a hypernorm of “necessary social efficiency,” which posits that all institutions 
and norms should operate to provide people with social goods.13  Andrew Spicer, building on the 
work of Donaldson and Dunfee, suggests that even if one sets aside a hypernorm prohibiting 
bribery, when it appears that local communities have negotiated a norm tolerating corruption 
their tolerance usually is only behavioral and they still retain a higher aspirational norm 
Israel are based on strong Jewish proscriptions of bribery); John T. Noonan Jr., Bribery, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS 
& PUB. POL’Y 741, 745–46 (1986) (describing an “intense spiritual hatred of bribery” in Christian literature). 
7 HARBANS SINGH, DEGH, TEGH, FAITH: SOCIO-ECONOMIC & RELIGIO-POLITICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF SIKHSIM 141 
(1986). 
8 U. Dhammaratana, The Social Philosophy of Buddhism, in THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF BUDDHISM 1, 18 
(Samdhong Rinpoche et al. eds., 1972). 
9 Hess & Dunfee, supra note 3, at 613 (citing JOHN T. NOONAN, BRIBES 702 (1984)); Matt A. Vega, Balancing 
Judicial Cognizance and Caution: Whether Transnational Corporations are Liable for Foreign Bribery Under the 
Alien Tort Statute, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 385, 391 (2010). 
10 The clarity of the rules does not, of course, ensure that they are correctly perceived.  Chong-Yeong Lee and 
Hideki Yoshihara note the difference between perception and reality and report that a number of international 
businesspeople mistakenly believe that bribery is a normalized practice in other countries.  Chong-Yeong Lee & 
Hideki Yoshihara, Business Ethics of Korean and Japanese Managers, 16 J. BUS. ETHICS 7, 10–11 (1997). 
11 Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Conception of Business Ethics: Integrative Social 
Contracts Theory, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 252, 260–65 (1994). 
12 THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A SOCIAL CONTRACTS APPROACH TO BUSINESS 
ETHICS 43–44 (1999). 
13 Id. at 229–30.  They also suggest that corruption usually violates a hypernorm providing for “a universal right to 
political participation.”  Thomas W. Dunfee & Thomas J. Donaldson, Untangling the Corruption Knot: Global 
Bribery Viewed Through the Lens of Integrative Social Contact Theory, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO BUSINESS 
ETHICS 61, 74 (Norman E. Bowie ed., 2002). 
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condemning corruption.14  Social contractarians tell businesspeople that they should not pay 
bribes.15 
 At the macro level, consequentialist discussions abound in accounts of corruption at the 
national and international level.16  Indeed, many observers attribute the shift in the global legal 
community’s willingness to discuss corruption to the transformation of that conversation from a 
moral discourse to one that emphasizes economic consequences;17  Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce 
describes the shift “from the moral argument to the economic one” as “a masterstroke.”18  
Scholars such as Susan Rose-Ackerman, Johann Lambsdorff, and Robert Klitgaard have 
thoroughly and convincingly marshaled together research that demonstrates the impediment to 
economic growth, degradation of social and political institutions, misallocation of resources and 
skills, impoverishment, and numerous other societal ills that corruption inflicts on polities and 
economies.19  As Steven Salbu points out, “no nation can miss the clear and highly publicized 
conclusion that corruption is economically devastating.”20 
14 Andrew Spicer, The Normalization of Corrupt Business Practices: Implications for Integrative Social Contracts 
Theory (ISCT), 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 833, 837–38 (2009).  Spicer does not take issue with Donaldson and Dunfee’s 
framework; rather, he uses their extensive analysis of corruption, which goes beyond simply finding corruption an 
illegitimate violation of a hypernorm, as an opening for his own exploration of the authenticity of local norms 
regarding corruption.  Id. at 837. 
15 See, e.g., Dunfee & Donaldson, supra note 13, at 74.  Donaldson and Dunfee acknowledge that in some instances 
the admonition to not pay bribes is an incomplete solution and recommend a longer-term approach that combines 
“business pressure, legal enforcement, and political will.”  DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 12, at 230. 
16 See Kaufman, supra note 2, at 41 (noting that the majority of corruption research is empirical studies of its 
effects). 
17 E.g., Padideh Ala’i, The WTO and the Anti-Corruption Movement, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 259, 273–75 
(2008); Beverly Earle, The United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Recommendation: When Moral Suasion Won’t Work, Try the Money Argument, 14 DICK. J. INT’L L. 207, 208, 226 
(1996); see also Carolyn Hotchkiss, The Sleeping Dog Stirs: New Signs of Life in Efforts to End Corruption in 
International Business, 17 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 108, 109–10 (1998) (describing the positive effect that the 
change in emphasis has had on research). 
18 Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce, Corruption and Competitiveness in Global Business—The Dawn of a New Era, 24 
MELB. U. L. Rev. 349, 364 (2000). But see Chantal Thomas, Does the “Good Governance Policy” of the 
International Financial Institutions Privilege Markets at the Expense of Democracy?, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 551, 560 
(1999) (lamenting the economic focus of the international financial institutions). 
19 See, e.g., ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 38–48 (1988) (discussing and explaining the manners 
in which corruption causes misallocations of goods and services, the generation of negative externalities, 
inefficiencies, distortion of incentives, the creation of corrupt rents, popular alienation and disenfranchisement, 
distortions in administration and bureaucracy, and public outrage, at the societal level); JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF, 
THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION AND REFORM: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND POLICY 58–134 (2007) 
(discussing voluminous empirical research on the damage at the societal level by corruption, developing new models 
to explain the relationships between corruption and societal damage, and developing and testing a model to show 
that corruption is not simply a transfer of rents); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: 
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND REFORM 9–26 (1999) (discussing and explaining how corruption leads to regulatory 
distortion and evasion, the entanglement of government and organized crime, market distortion and inefficiency, 
bureaucratic distortion and malfeasance, systemic degradation, and the delegitimization of and disengagement from 
government). 
20 Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 419, 
446 (1999).  Bill Shaw points out that the effects of bribery are particularly devastating for emerging economies.  
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 Philosophers, theologists, and ethicists have clearly demonstrated the deontological and 
social contract proscriptions on bribery at both the macro and micro levels; economists and other 
social scientists have demonstrated the destructive consequences that bribery inflicts at the macro 
level.  Why then is bribery “universally disapproved yet universally present”?21  The absence 
within the literature of a systematic analysis at the firm level of the consequences of breaching 
bribery rules, in the tradition of Rose-Ackerman, Lambsdorff, or Klitgaard, could contribute to 
the persistence of bribery.  From the individual businessperson’s perspective, questions remain 
regarding the business case for complying with bribery laws.  This article seeks to fill that gap. 
 There is a dearth of firm-level empirical data on the consequences of paying bribes.  In 
the last decade, however, some scholars have conducted firm-level inquiries; their findings, 
combined with theoretical discussions of corruption and with the regulatory environment, allow 
for a reasonable discussion of the consequences at the firm level of paying bribes.  Moreover, a 
survey of local laws and of international corruption regimes demonstrates the contingent legal 
liabilities for the payment of bribes.  A very strong business case exists for complying with the 
rules regarding bribery. 
 This article first clarifies the definitions of bribery and corruption.  The article then 
examines direct and indirect costs of paying bribes22 and the effect of corruption on potential 
relationships.23  Finally, the article discusses potential criminal liability, particularly in light of 
the expansive international legal regime.24  The totality of these costs and liabilities strongly 
suggest that the consequences for any given firm of paying a bribe would burden rather than 
benefit the firm. 
 
 
I.  DEFINITIONS AND MODES OF ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION 
 
A. Definitions 
 
Corruption engenders complicated definitional and philosophical debates.25  This article uses the 
most common definition of corruption:  abuse or misuse of a position of trust or responsibility 
for private gain rather than the purpose for which that trust or responsibility was conferred.26  
Bill Shaw, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Progeny: Morally Unassailable, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 689, 691 
(2000). 
21 Hess & Dunfee, supra note 3, at 595. 
22 See infra Part II. 
23 See infra Part III. 
24 See infra Part IV. 
25 Arnold Heidenheimer suggests three broad categories of attempts to define public sector corruption: public office-
centered, moral and public interest-centered, and market-based types of definitions.  ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER, 
POLITICAL CORRUPTION:  READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 4 (1970); see also Maryvonne Génaux, Social 
Sciences and the Evolving Concept of Corruption, 42 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 13, 13–16 (2004) (discussing the 
continued relevance of Heidenheimer’s categorization).   
26 Joseph Nye first offered a form of this definition.  See Joseph S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 419 & n.10 (1967); see also Patrick X. Delaney, Transnational 
Corruption: Regulation Across Borders, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 413, 417 (2007) (referring to Nye’s as the “classic 
definition”).  This general definition is used by nongovernment organizations such as Transparency International, 
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Corruption can manifest itself in numerous forms, such as nepotism, collusion, or theft.27  This 
article deals primarily with the form of corruption known as bribery.  Bribery consists of a 
transaction in which a person abuses or misuses a position of trust or responsibility, quid pro quo 
something of value.28  Unfortunately, a great deal of the literature on corruption and bribery 
conflates the two terms, and many of the studies referred to in this article use the term 
“corruption” even though they examine bribery.29  This article tries to, but cannot always, avoid 
confusion of terms when referring to these studies. 
 Corruption and bribery can exist in interactions between firms and government or in 
interactions solely among private firms.30  Most of the research discussed in this article takes 
account of interactions between firms and government.  Private sector corruption—corruption in 
interactions between private firms—probably imposes tremendous costs on firms as well, and 
also merits serious scholarly attention.31  Good reasons exist, however, for the focus by scholars 
on public sector corruption.  At the simplest level, scholars have access to more data concerning 
public sector corruption.  Public sector corruption also preoccupies scholars because it implicates 
the viability of fundamental social institutions.32  Most of the lessons discerned from an 
examination of public sector bribery, however, translate to bribery in any interaction. 
 
B. Dynamic Versus Static Analysis 
 
which defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain,” Frequently Asked Questions About 
Corruption, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq (last visited Oct. 1, 
2011), and the World Bank, which defines corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gain,” World Bank 
Grp., Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank, WORLD BANK, 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor02.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) (emphasis 
removed).  This definition allows for a general discussion of corruption; the legality or illegality of a particular 
action depends on the precise wording of the criminal laws of a government having jurisdiction over that action. 
27 James P. Wesberry, Jr., International Financial Institutions Face the Corruption Eruption: If the IFIs Put Their 
Muscle and Money Where Their Mouth Is, the Corruption Eruption May Be Capped, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 498, 
504 (1998); see also James Thuo Gathii, Defining the Relationship Between Human Rights and Corruption, 31 U. 
PA. J. INT’L L. 125, 182–83 (2009) (describing other permutations of corruption). 
28 ROSE-ACKERMAN, 19 note 19, at 93; Stephen F. Smith, Essay, Proportional Mens Rea, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
127, 142 (2009) (emphasizing that the U.S. federal bribery statute requires mens rea for an act to rise from a gratuity 
to a bribe). 
29 See MICHAEL JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION:  WEALTH, POWER, AND DEMOCRACY 20–21 (2005) 
(bemoaning the confusion of the terms in corruption literature). 
30 See Edward C. Banfield, Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization, 18 J.L. & ECON. 587, 591–99 
(1975) (distinguishing private sector corruption from public sector corruption). 
31 See Blake E. Ashforth et al., Re-Viewing Organizational Corruption, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 670, 672–76 (2008) 
(discussing research on the harms of private sector corruption at the firm, industry, national, and systems levels). 
32 See Jeffrey M. Blum, The Divisible First Amendment: A Critical Functionalist Approach to Freedom of Speech 
and Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1370 (1983) (“When an official is bribed, there is an 
immediate harm to the legitimacy of government regardless of the substantive ends the bribe is intended to 
achieve.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/Private Distinction, 35 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 427, 463 (1998) (“The absence of exit or other forms of loss protection (i.e., diversification, 
insurance, etc.) provides some justification for less tolerance for public corruption relative to private corruption.”). 
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To understand corruption, one must evaluate its effects dynamically rather than statically.  Much 
of the older “grease money” literature suggested that, in an overly bureaucratized system, 
corruption allowed business firms to bypass bureaucracy and therefore lowered costs for those 
firms.33  These analyses conceived of corruption as exogenous to the relationship between a firm 
and the bureaucracy.34  According to this analysis, each bribe affects only that particular 
transaction: the background condition of corruption is not affected by the bribe, and bribes are 
not affected by the background condition of corruption. 
 Scholars with experience in corruption, however, describe corruption as dynamically 
involved with those bureaucracies.  Susan Rose-Ackerman, a groundbreaking scholar on the 
political economy of corruption, addresses the exogenous perception of corruption head on: “I 
disagree. . . .  [T]he authors [who suggest that routine corruption may confer benefits] assume 
that officials have only limited discretion.  For example, the tax collector ‘discovers’ the tax 
liabilities of citizens and firms.  In reality, he or she might ‘create’ tax liabilities as a bribe 
extraction device.”35 Field observation strongly supports Rose-Ackerman’s argument.  In the 
1980s, Robert Wade described the relationships between rice farmers in southern India and 
officials of the Irrigation Department.36 He observed that, among other things, bureaucrats hid 
information, delayed action, and obfuscated rules and facts so that they could leverage ever 
larger bribes from farmers who needed water.37  Salim Rashid observed the degradation of a 
telephone system in India as bureaucrats created ever longer delays so that they could extract 
ever larger bribes.38  By the 1990s, scholars generally agreed that dynamic analysis provides 
more accurate descriptions of the effects of corruption than does static analysis.39  Dynamic 
analysis recognizes the “intertemporal linkages” between decisions:  “decisions made today 
affect those to be made in the future.”40  Scholars also agreed that a dynamic analysis generally 
indicated that over time the costs of corruption generally outweigh any benefits.41 
33 See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 386 (1968); Nathaniel H. Leff, 
Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption, 8 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 8, 11 (1964). 
34 See Francis T. Lui, An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery, 93 J. POL. ECON. 760, 762–66 (1985), for an 
example of this type of analysis. 
35 ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 19, at 16. 
36 Robert Wade, The System of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South India, 18 J. DEV. 
STUD. 287, 287 (1982). 
37 Robert Wade, Irrigation Reform in Conditions of Populist Anarchy: An Indian Case, 14 J. DEV. ECON. 285, 286-
87 (1984); Wade, supra note 36, at 313–14. 
38 Salim Rashid, Public Utilities in Egalitarian LDC’s: The Role of Bribery in Achieving Pareto Efficiency, 34 
KYKLOS: INT’L REV. FOR SOC. SCI. 448, 448–55 (1981). 
39 See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Corruption—A General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of the World Bank, 15 
DICK. J. INT’L L. 451, 454–55 (1997). 
40 MICHAEL R. CAPUTO, FOUNDATIONS OF DYNAMIC ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: OPTIMAL CONTROL THEORY AND 
APPLICATIONS ix (2005). 
41 See WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION:  THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK 14-15 (Sept. 
1997), available at http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corrptn.pdf (stating that, by using 
a dynamic analysis, what appears to be a short-term gain can be shown to impose tremendous costs in the long run); 
Edgardo Buscaglia & Maria Dakolias, An Analysis of the Causes of Corruption in the Judiciary, 30 LAW & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 95, 112 (1999) (“[P]resent corruption decreases future productivity, thereby reducing dynamic 
efficiency.”). 
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 Businesspeople instinctively recognize the dynamic effects of corruption, even if they do 
not always act rationally based on that recognition.  Businesspeople recognize that one can earn a 
reputation as a dishonest actor or a corrupt business; earning a reputation takes time and occurs 
over several interactions.  The qualitative literature on corruption overflows with accounts from 
businesspeople of the costs accumulated over time associated with the reputational effects of 
paying bribes.42  Two very experienced transnational corporate lawyers describe the experience 
of businesses in strong terms: 
 
[W]hen a company first agrees to pay bribes, it is immediately tainted with a reputation 
for corruption that is virtually impossible to shake.  Virtue, once lost, is rarely ever 
regained. One payment quickly becomes two, then four, and so on. The smell of 
corruption attracts other would-be bribees like flies, all of whom exert their leverage by 
threatening to report previous transgressions.43 
 
Elizabeth Spahn adds, simply, “The bribe price goes up.”44 
 Daniel Kaufman and Shang-Jin Wei suggest dynamic analysis of corruption at the firm 
level.45  They develop a theoretical model that looks beyond the effects of a single transaction.  
They base their model on a Stackelberg “game between a rent-seeking government official and a 
representative firm,” and then use backward induction to solve for the equilibrium level of 
official harassment and cost of time spent with government officials.46  Their model predicts that 
“firms that pay more bribes not only face a higher nominal rate of harassment in equilibrium, but 
also have to deal with a higher effective rate of harassment.”47  They therefore predict, based on 
this model, that in the real world firms that pay bribes will bear more, not less, costs due to 
42 See ALEXANDRA ADDISON WRAGE, BRIBERY AND EXTORTION: UNDERMINING BUSINESS, GOVERNMENTS, AND 
SECURITY 31 (2007) (“Representatives of multinational companies operating overseas describe a consistent trend. 
When these companies pay bribes to resolve some short-term nuisance, they report that the bribe-taker returns, the 
word spreads, and the demands multiply.”); Beverley Earle & Anita Cava, Are Anti-Corruption Efforts Paying Off? 
International and National Measures in the Asia-Pacific Region and Their Impact on India and Multinational 
Corporations, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 59, 84 (2009) (discussing revelations of corporate counsels that paying bribes 
engenders a reputation which leads to greater bribe demands); Hess & Dunfee, supra note 3, at 609 (reporting 
discussions with business leaders regarding value of good reputation with respect to corruption); Tor Krever, 
Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83, 86-87 
(2008) (describing reputational costs experienced by firms that have paid bribes). 
43 Michael A. Almond & Scott D. Syfert, Beyond Compliance: Corruption, Corporate Responsibility and Ethical 
Standards in the New Global Economy, 22 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 389, 444 (1997). 
44 Elizabeth Spahn, Nobody Gets Hurt?, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 861, 887 (2010); see also Krever, supra note 42, at 87 
(“Moreover, an official who knows payments have been made in the past can increase bureaucratic interference to 
engender further bribes.”). 
45 Daniel Kaufman & Shang-Jin Wei, Does “Grease Money” Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce? (World Bank 
Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2254, 1999), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=629191. 
46 Id. at 3.  The Stackelberg Game is a non-zero-sum, two-player game in which the players do not have information 
about each other’s strategies.  M. Simaan & J.B. Cruz, Jr., On the Stackelberg Strategy in Nonzero-Sum Games, 11 
J. OPTIMIZATION THEORY & APPLICATIONS 533, 534 (1973). 
47 Kaufman & Wei, supra note 45, at 5. 
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bureaucratic interference.48  Kaufman and Wei’s model suggests what many businesspeople 
already know: the dynamic effects of corruption apply at the firm level as well as at the country 
or regional level.  These direct and indirect costs imposed on the firm are discussed in the next 
section of this article. 
 
 
II.  ENGAGING IN BRIBERY INCREASES DIRECT COSTS AND INDIRECT COSTS 
 
Very few—if any—firms pay bribes in order to enhance the well being of the bribe-taking 
government official.  Firms pay bribes in hopes of obtaining a business advantage, such as lower 
costs, greater efficiencies, or access to relationships or markets.49  A simplistic, static analysis of 
a bribe request might suggest that payment of a bribe could accrue an advantage.  More 
sophisticated analysis, however, suggests the opposite; empirical evidence also indicates that 
corrupt behavior imposes costs on a firm. 
 
A. Bribery Increases Direct Costs 
 
The most starkly demonstrated cost imposed by paying bribes is time spent dealing with 
bureaucracy.  This may seem counterintuitive, particularly given slang terms for bribes such as 
“speed money.”50  Understanding corruption as a dynamic process, however, casts light on the 
cost imposed by bribery.  Corruption creates a relationship, perhaps between the bribe payer and 
a bribe-taking official, but certainly between the bribe payer and the bureaucracy.51  Power 
resides asymmetrically in the parties: the official has control over a resource or service desired 
by the firm, whereas the firm only has money.52  The official acts as an agent of the state for 
purposes of controlling the resource or service but acts out of self-interest when disbursing them, 
and thus is not well-constrained by the strictures of responsibility to the state; indeed, market 
forces may form a more powerful constraint on a corrupt bureaucrat’s behavior.53  The firm has 
48 Id. 
49 ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 19, at 92–93. 
50 See Amy L. Chua, The Paradox of Free Market Democracy: Rethinking Development Policy, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
287, 310 (2000) (using the slang term). 
51 ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 19, at 113. 
52 Ronald MacLean Abaroa, Towards 2005: Profits, People, and the Future of the Regulatory State in the Free 
Market Model, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 131, 136 (1999); see also Nsongurua J. Udombana, How Should We 
Then Live? Globalization and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, 20 B.U. INT’L L.J. 293, 343 (2002) 
(emphasizing the moral obligation of government to fight corruption given this asymmetry). 
53 Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson observed these market forces in operation: “These results suggest that public 
officials act as price (bribe) discriminators, demanding higher bribes (for a given public service) from firms that can 
afford to pay, and demanding lower bribes from firms that credibly can threaten to exit the market or use other 
means to acquire the service.”  Ritva Reinikka & Jakob Svensson, Measuring and Understanding Corruption at the 
Micro Level, in CORRUPT EXCHANGES:  EMPIRICAL THEMES IN THE POLITICS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
CORRUPTION 135, 143 (Donatella Della Porta & Susan Rose-Ackerman eds., 2002).  Other factors, of course, 
constrain the bribe-seeking official.  See Philip M. Nichols, The Perverse Effect of Campaign Contribution Limits: 
Reducing the Allowable Amount Increases the Likelihood of Corruption in the Federal Legislature, 48 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 77, 100–13 (2011) (describing factors considered by a public official contemplating a bribe, including criminal 
penalties, social costs, and psychic costs). 
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already indicated a willingness to pay an illicit fee in order to avoid bureaucratic delay or to 
secure administrative approval; nothing exists to prevent the official from creating new and 
greater delays or from simply renegotiating the size of the illicit fee. 
 Jay Pil Choi and Marcel Thum label this process the “ratchet effect” of corruption.54  
Choi and Thum join Kaufman and Wei in developing theoretical models to describe the costs 
associated with the ratchet effect.  Kaufman and Wei go on to test their theory regarding direct 
costs against empirical evidence.  Using data from several thousands of responses to surveys 
conducted for the Global Competitiveness Report and the World Development Report,55 holding 
other factors constant, and comparing bribe-paying and non-bribe-paying firms within the same 
countries, Kaufman and Wei find that “firms that pay more bribes, in equilibrium, experience 
more, not less, time wasted with the officials on matters related to regulations.”56  The same is 
true when firms of similar size and other characteristics are compared.57  The same is true when 
comparing only companies operating in Asia.58  The same is true when different data sets are 
analyzed.59  Firms that pay bribes spend more, not less, time and money in dealing with 
government. 
 Other empirical studies corroborate and amplify these findings.  Alejandro Gaviria, for 
example, applies a slightly different model to firm-level data from Latin America and still 
finds—when directly comparing firms that pay bribes to firms that do not pay bribes—that the 
payment of bribes increases rather than lowers costs for an individual firm.60  Jakob Svensson, 
using very detailed firm-level data from Uganda, finds no evidence for the “grease money” 
hypothesis but does find that paying bribes damages firm operations.61 
 Donato De Rosa, Nishaal Gooroochurn, and Holger Görg explicitly test, at the firm level, 
the hypothesis that bribery acts as “grease” that allows firms to escape burdensome regulation.62  
They find no empirical evidence to support that hypothesis.63  De Rosa, Gooroochurn, and 
Görg’s study also yielded two additional empirical observations quite pertinent to a business case 
54 Jay Pil Choi & Marcel Thum, The Dynamics of Corruption with the Ratchet Effect, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 427, 428 
(2003). 
55 Kaufman & Wei, supra note 45, at 5–6. 
56 Id. at 10; see also id. at 12 (“[F]irms that report paying more bribes also spend more time negotiating with the 
bureaucracies . . . .”). 
57 See id. at 9–10, 12. 
58 See id. at 10.  Kaufman and Wei separately analyzed companies operating in Asia because some people argue that 
the high growth experienced by many Asian countries indicates that corruption operates differently in Asia.  See, 
e.g., Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1320, 1329–30 
(1997). 
59 See Kaufman & Wei, supra note 45, at 12. 
60 Alejandro Gaviria, Assessing the Effects of Corruption and Crime on Firm Performance: Evidence from Latin 
America, 3 EMERGING MARKETS REV. 245, 267 (2002). 
61 See Jakob Svensson, The Cost of Doing Business: Firms’ Experiences With Corruption, in UGANDA’S RECOVERY: 
THE ROLE OF FARMS, FIRMS, AND GOVERNMENT 319, 319–20 (Ritva Reinikka & Paul Collier eds., 2001). 
62 Donato De Rosa et al., Corruption and Productivity Firm-Level Evidence from the BEEPS Survey 3–4 (World 
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 5348, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1630232. 
63 Id. at 34. 
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to not pay bribes.  They compare the costs imposed on a firm by the payment of bribes to the 
costs imposed by lengthy bureaucratic processes.64  They find that the payment of bribes 
imposed real and significant costs on firms, but that—contrary to almost any prediction—the 
bureaucratic delay experienced by firms not paying bribes did not impose significant costs.65  
They also find that the costs imposed on firms by paying bribes were greater in countries that 
experienced higher background levels of corruption.66  In other words, even though a firm might 
operate in a country where corruption seems “normal,” that firm would still accrue costs rather 
than benefits by paying bribes when compared to firms that do not pay bribes. 
 Kaufman and Wei also examined the cost of acquiring capital.  In many countries 
bureaucrats can exert considerable control over the flow of capital.67  If bribes do in fact 
facilitate government action, then firms that pay bribes should obtain capital at lower costs.  In 
fact, Kaufman and Wei found the opposite to be true: “firms that have paid more bribes also have 
a higher, not lower, cost of capital.”68  In general, corruption increases the cost of raising capital 
through bonds and decreases the value of equity.69 
 Paying bribes increases costs as well as the amount of time spent interacting with 
bureaucrats.  These consequences alone create a strong business case against the payment of 
bribes.  High direct costs, however, are not the only consequences of the payment of bribes. 
 
B. Bribery Lowers Rates of Growth 
 
Empirical studies indicate that firms that pay bribes experience lower rates of growth.  Raymond 
Fisman and Jakob Svensson compare, at the firm level, the effect of the payment of bribes and 
the payment of taxes on firm growth.70  Fisman and Svensson use firm-level data from firms in 
several industries in Uganda.71  They recognize that the apparent relationship between the 
payment of bribes and growth can be deceptive because high-growth or high-profit firms may 
choose to pay or be targeted for the payment of higher bribes.72  They therefore develop a model 
to factor out growth factors endogenous to corruption and compare firms with comparable 
64 Id. at 5. 
65 See id. at 34. 
66 See id. at 5–6. 
67 See Christopher Gulinello, Engineering a Venture Capital Market and the Effects of Government Control on 
Private Ordering: Lessons from the Taiwan Experience, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 845, 845–47 (2005) 
(discussing these controls). 
68 Kaufman & Wei, supra note 45, at 11. 
69 Francisco Ciocchini et al., Does Corruption Increase Emerging Market Bond Spreads?, 55 J. ECON. & BUS. 503, 
512–13 (2003); Charles M.C. Lee & David Ng, Corruption and International Valuation: Does Virtue Pay?, 18 J. 
INVESTING 23, 31-33 (2005); see also Mark J. Garmaise & Jun Liu, Corruption, Firm Governance, and the Cost of 
Capital, ESCHOLARSHIP UNIV. OF CAL. 24–25 (Feb. 28, 2005), http://repositories.cdlib.org/anderson/fin/1-05 
(finding that corruption decreased firm value and thus increased the costs of raising capital). 
70 Raymond Fisman & Jakob Svensson, Are Corruption and Taxation Really Harmful to Growth? Firm-Level 
Evidence, 83 J. DEV. ECON. 63, 63–64 (2007). 
71 Id. at 67-69. 
72 See id. at 65. 
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characteristics.73  They find “robust evidence that higher corruption is associated with lower firm 
growth.”74  Specifically, they find that a one percent increase in the rate of bribery “is associated 
with a reduction in firm growth of more than three percentage points.”75  Intriguingly, they also 
find that the payment of bribes is three times more damaging to growth than payment of an 
equivalent amount of taxes.76  These findings specifically include short-term growth.77 
 Alejandro Gaviria does not examine the effect of paying bribes on general firm growth; 
rather, he examines at the firm level the effect of paying bribes on the growth of sales.78  He uses 
survey data from more than twenty countries across Latin America.79  Like Fisman and 
Svensson, Gaviria distinguishes his study from other research on the relationship between 
corruption and performance by engaging in firm-level analysis, factoring out other conditions 
that might affect comparative growth in sales.80  As an empirical matter, Gaviria finds that the 
payment of bribes does not lead to more sales growth but in fact actually lowers sales growth.81  
More generally, he also finds that the payment of bribes lowers investment and employment 
growth, which suggests lower overall growth.82 
 None of these findings support an argument that bribery confers an advantage.  Indeed, 
these studies suggest that the payment of bribes renders a firm less competitive.  Lower rates of 
growth could in part be attributed to the additional costs accrued through paying bribes.  Lower 
rates of sales growth, however, strongly suggest a negative dynamic effect of bribery: the 
payment of a bribe leads to more interference and more demands for bribes, igniting a vicious 
circle in which the payment of more bribes leads to demands for more bribes rather than to 
bureaucratic transparency and facilitation.  
 
C. Bribery Is Related to Lower Productivity 
 
“Productivity,” in general, has to do with output per factor;83 at the firm level one important 
measure has to do with the efficient relationship between capital and labor.84  No empiricist has 
conducted firm-level research on the extent to which paying bribes affects productivity.  Johann 
Graf Lambsdorff has, however, studied the effects of corruption on firm productivity through 
73 See id. at 66–67. 
74 Svensson, supra note 61, at 320. 
75 Fisman & Svensson, supra note 70, at 64. 
76 See id. at 70. 
77 Id. at 73.  Fisman and Svensson conclude, “[T]he evidence we have presented and complementary, qualitative 
information from firm managers, points in one direction – corruption is a serious constraint on doing business.”  Id.  
78 See Gaviria, supra note 60, at 245. 
79 Id. at 250. 
80 See id. at 245. 
81 Id. at 246. 
82 Id. 
83 D. W. Jorgenson & Z. Griliches, The Explanation of Productivity Change, 34 REV. ECON. STUD. 249, 250 (1967). 
84 See Michael S. Knoll & Thomas D. Griffith, Taxing Sunny Days: Adjusting Taxes for Regional Living Costs and 
Amenities, 116 HARV. L. REV. 987, 997 n.42 (2003). 
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country comparison.85  Lambsdorff predicts that corruption will decrease productivity because 
corruption distorts decision making, allocation of resources, and the creation of relationships.86  
Empirical analysis supports this prediction.  Lambsdorff finds that corruption significantly 
reduces productivity: a ten percent increase in the average amount of corruption experienced by 
firms in the aggregate reduces productivity by two percent.87  Using Tanzania and the United 
Kingdom as examples, he finds that if Tanzanian firms experienced the levels of corruption 
experienced by British firms, total output of the Tanzanian firms would increase by twenty 
percent.88 
 Ernesto Dal Bó and Martín Rossi conduct a similar study, still comparing firms in the 
aggregate but comparing only firms within a single industry (electric utility companies) and a 
single region (Latin America).89  Dal Bó and Rossi predict that bribery inhibits growth because 
“in a corrupt environment the fate of a firm is not tightly related to managerial efforts devoted to 
supervising and coordinating the use of productive factors.”90  Turning to the empirical data, 
they too find a strong association between experience with corruption and less productive use of 
capital.91  They too use countries to illustrate the magnitude of the effect; their research indicates 
that if electric utilities in Brazil experienced corruption only to the extent that companies in 
Costa Rica experienced corruption, those utilities would use seven percent fewer workers to 
provide the same amount of electricity that they provide today.92 
 Lower productivity again demonstrates the dynamic effect of bribery and corruption.  A 
firm that pays bribes becomes embroiled in a relationship in which it is to the bureaucrat’s 
advantage to create delays and obstacles that the firm must then pay to have removed.  
Moreover, the firm may have no easy route for exit from this relationship.  As Elizabeth Spahn 
points out, the bureaucrat has a strong incentive to maintain the relationship and can release 
embarrassing or incriminating information about the firm if the firm attempts to leave the 
relationship.93 
 
 
III.  PAYING BRIBES NEGATIVELY AFFECTS RELATIONSHIPS 
 
85 Johann Graf Lambsdorff, How Corruption Affects Productivity, 56 KYKLOS: INT’L REV. FOR SOC. SCI. 457, 457-
69 (2003). 
86 See id. at 457. 
87 Id. at 468. 
88 Id. at 468–69. 
89 See Ernesto Dal Bó & Martín A. Rossi, Corruption and Inefficiency: Theory and Evidence from Electric Utilities, 
91 J. PUB. ECON. 939, 939–60 (2007). 
90 Id. at 940. 
91 See id. at 958. 
92 Id. 
93 See Spahn, supra note 44, at 888–89.  Spahn suggests that, in extreme situations, “drive-by shootings are a 
possible exit strategy for unwanted partners.”  Id. at 889 (commenting specifically on experiences of Western 
business representatives in Russia).  Her wry observation underscores the lack of transparent institutions to mediate 
the relationship between the bribe-paying firm and the bribe-accepting public official. 
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Bribery’s effect on time, money, growth, and productivity is a product of the dynamic 
relationship between a bribe-paying firm and a bribe-taking public official.  Bribery also 
diminishes relationships other than the relationship between the firm and the public official, and 
its effect on those relationships can impose indirect costs on a firm.  Bribery affects both internal 
and external relationships; this article discusses each in turn. 
 
A. Bribery Damages Internal Relationships 
 
The payment of bribes creates a workplace in which employees are more likely to steal materials 
or opportunities from the employer.  Many factors contribute to a decision by an employee to 
engage in misconduct.94  The firm’s “ethical climate,” however, sends very powerful signals to 
employees about appropriate and acceptable behaviors.95  Bart Victor and John Cullen created an 
early typography of ethical climates, describing them as self-interested, benevolent, or 
principled.96  David Fritzsche points out that these three categories reflect three dominant 
categories of ethical frameworks: egoism, utilitarianism, and deontology.97  Others have 
subsequently offered more nuanced categories.98 Regardless of the schema used, the fact that a 
firm’s organizational climate can create an environment of self-serving, egoistic behavior 
constitutes the salient insight.99 
 Behaviors engaged in, condoned by, or rewarded by managers play a large role in 
creating the ethical environment.  Large firms seeking to enhance the ethical quality of their 
enterprises are advised to set the tone from the top.100  The same is patently true of small firms; 
in a survey of small enterprise professionals, “[t]he majority of respondents reported that top 
management set the ethical tone for the organization and had the most influence on unethical 
94 See William T. Ross & Diana C. Robertson, A Typology of Situational Factors: Impact on Salesperson Decision-
Making About Ethical Issues, 46 J. BUS. ETHICS 213, 228 (2003) (discussing their empirical study which 
demonstrates that environmental and personal factors interact in complex ways to affect decisions about 
misconduct). 
95 Mitchell J. Neubert et al., The Virtuous Influence of Ethical Leadership Behavior: Evidence from the Field, 90 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 157, 157 (2009).  Bart Victor and John Cullen define an ethical climate: “A work climate is defined as 
perceptions that ‘are psychologically meaningful molar descriptions that people can agree characterize a system’s 
practices and procedures.’  The prevailing perceptions of typical organizational practices and procedures that have 
ethical content constitute the ethical work climate.”  Bart Victor & John B. Cullen, The Organizational Bases of 
Ethical Work Climates, 33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 101, 101 (1988) (quoting Benjamin Schneider, Organizational Climate: 
An Essay, 28 PERSONNEL PSYCH. 447, 474 (1975)) (emphasis added). 
96 Victor & Cullen, supra note 95, at 104. 
97 David J. Fritzsche, Ethical Climates and the Ethical Dimension of Decision Making, 24 J. BUS. ETHICS 125, 125 
(2000). 
98 See, e.g., Anke Arnaud, Conceptualizing and Measuring Ethical Work Climate: Development and Validation of 
the Ethical Climate Index, 49 BUS. & SOC’Y 345, 354–56 (2010) (proposing an Ethical Climate Index). 
99 See Marshall Schminke et al., The Power of Ethical Work Climates, 36 ORG. DYNAMICS 171, 175 (2007) 
(discussing empirical research on the powerful effects of workplace ethics climates). 
100 Al Y.S. Chen et al., Reinforcing Ethical Decision Making Through Corporate Culture, 16 J. BUS. ETHICS 855, 
861 (1997). 
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decisions.”101  Rule-breaking behavior by managers, therefore, creates a workplace environment 
in which employees consider self-serving behaviors acceptable. 
 Empirical studies have directly linked the payment of bribes by firms to self-serving 
misbehaviors by employees.  In controlled laboratory experiments, participants who were 
rewarded by supervisors for cheating by offering bribes during games were more likely than 
other participants to engage in self-serving behaviors.102    A survey of municipal office workers 
found that the single greatest factor contributing to self-serving behavior was the observation of 
bribe-taking by managers.103 Indeed, mere exposure to the tolerance of bribe-giving in a firm has 
been found to significantly contribute to self-serving misbehavior.104 Conversely, studies of 
South African firms in which purchasing departments adhered to high standards of conduct 
found that a strong and shared ethical climate constituted a critical element in the departments’ 
good performances. 105 
 Self-serving misbehavior imposes very burdensome costs on firms.  Kickbacks, for 
example, rob firms of discounts or other savings that should accrue to the firm or burden the firm 
with shoddy goods and services.106  Workplace theft and fraud impose even greater costs.  “The 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners . . . has reported that the typical U.S. firm loses six 
percent of its annual revenues to employee fraud.”107  This translates to almost seven hundred 
billion U.S. dollars lost each year to employee misconduct.108  Worldwide data is difficult to 
obtain, but the numbers that are available depict a staggering problem.  Employee theft—a subset 
of employee misconduct—imposes serious costs; by one estimate employee theft costs firms 
around the world over one hundred billion dollars each year.109  Chinese firms lose over nineteen 
billion U.S. dollars to employee theft alone;110 even Australian and New Zealand firms lose 
101 Scott J. Vitell et al., Ethical Problems, Conflicts and Beliefs of Small Business Professionals, 28 J. BUS. ETHICS 
15, 22 (2000). 
102 William A. Weeks et al., The Role of Mere Exposure Effect on Ethical Tolerance: A Two-Study Approach, 58 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 281, 282 (2005). 
103 See Willa Bruce, Ethical People Are Productive People, 17 PUB. PRODUCTIVITY & MGMT. REV. 241, 248 (1994). 
104 See Weeks et al., supra note 102, at 289. 
105 See J.A. Badenhorst, Unethical Behaviour in Procurement: A Perspective on Causes and Solutions, 13 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 739, 743 (1994). 
106 See Daniel T. Ostas, When Fraud Pays: Executive Self-Dealing and the Failure of Self-Restraint, 44 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 571, 572–73 (2007) (discussing enormous amount of money lost to kickbacks). 
107 Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Beyond the Ethics Course: Making Conduct Count, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 757, 757 
(2008) (citing Cary Meiners, Employee Fraud: Detecting and Eliminating the Unintentional Perk, RISK MGMT., 
April 2005, at 50, 51 (citing ASS'N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM'RS, 2004 REPORT TO THE NATION ON OCCUPATIONAL 
FRAUD AND ABUSE (2004))). 
108 Id.; see also Sharon Goott Nissim, Stopping a Vicious Cycle: The Problems with Credit Checks in Employment 
and Strategies to Limit Their Use, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 45, 49 n.24 (2010) (stating that employee 
theft costs U.S. retailers thirty billion dollars each year). 
109 Roberto Concepcion, Jr., Pre-Employment Credit Checks: Effectuating Disparate Impact on Racial Minorities 
Under the Guise of Job-Relatedness and Business Necessity, 12 SCHOLAR 523, 538 n.73 (2010) (citing William I. 
Sauser, Employee Theft: Who, How, Why, and What Can Be Done, S.A.M. ADVANCED MGMT. J. , Summer 2007, at 
13). 
110 Tang Zhihao, Businesses Lose Billions; Consumers End Up Paying, CHINADAILY (May 12, 2011, 10:24 AM), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-05/12/content_12496247.htm. 
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almost a billion dollars each year.111  These hits to the bottom line have profound and tangible 
effects:  “The U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates that . . . 30% of corporate bankruptcies are 
a direct result of employee theft.”112 
 Empiricists who study the connection between firm bribery and self-serving misbehavior 
by employees reach consensus on the means to reduce the harmful misbehavior inside the firm: 
managers should stop paying or tolerating the payment of bribes to parties outside of the firm.113  
Those bribes create an environment in which employees are more likely to consider self-serving 
misbehavior appropriate.  The actions, such as office theft, which are associated with an 
environment in which people consider self-serving misbehavior to be appropriate constitute a 
significant cost associated with the paying bribes.  
 
B. Bribery Damages or Precludes External Relationships 
 
The payment of a bribe could affect relationships with a potential customer of goods or services.  
Little empirical research exists to show the extent to which this happens, but at least two aspects 
of this consequence merit attention. 
 First, to the extent that customers include members of the general public, in most 
countries that public despises corruption.  Survey after survey demonstrates that even in 
countries experiencing endemic corruption people dislike the practice and understand the harm it 
inflicts on their society.  Sahr John Kapundeh, for example, found that even while Sierra Leone 
suffered myriad nation-threatening crises, respondents to his survey singled corruption out for 
particular condemnation.114  Surveys reveal high levels of societal rebuke in countries in a 
variety of economic or political states including, for example, Cameroon,115 Kazakhstan,116 
111 Shoplifting Costing up to $800m a Year, NZ HERALD (Oct. 20, 2010, 10:11 AM), 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10681819. 
112 Terence Daryl Shulman, Hard Times Lead to Increase in Stealing, Overshopping, and Overspending?, ANNALS 
AM. PSYCHOTHERAPY ASSOC., Spring 2009, at 32, 32. 
113 See Badenhorst, supra note 105, at 744; Bruce, supra note 103, at 249; Vitell et al., supra note 101, at 22. 
114 SAHR JOHN KPUNDEH, POLITICS AND CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF SIERRA LEONE 109, 115 (1995). 
115 CENTRE DE RECHERCHE ET D’ETUDES EN ECONOMIE ET SONDAGE, ENQUETE NATIONALE 2006 AUPRES DES 
ENTREPRISES SUR LA CORRUPTION AU CAMEROUN 15 (2007), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/16826/226689/file/Comeroon_Rapport_final%20cretes_Entreprises
FINAL.pdf.  
116 Philip M. Nichols, The Fit Between Changes to the International Corruption Regime and Indigenous Perceptions 
of Corruption in Kazakhstan, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 863, 923 (2001). 
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Peru,117 Romania,118 and South Asia,119 as well as students in Bulgaria, Mongolia,120 and 
Russia.121  Anecdotal evidence suggests that after the collapse of the corrupt Suharto regime in 
Indonesia, firms that collaborated with Suharto had difficulty marketing within Indonesia.122  
Firms should recognize the possibility of damage to relationships with the broad pool of potential 
customers, even though the damage is inchoate. 
 Second, the payment of bribes definitively precludes relationships with a growing 
number of specific customers.  Most international financial institutions, as well as many 
governments, maintain lists of suppliers and consultants debarred from contracts or projects due 
to involvement in corruption.123  The World Bank, for example, not only debars firms and 
consultants who have acted corruptly in association with a World Bank project, but it also debars 
firms and consultants that have been debarred by the Asian Development Bank and European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development.124  China excludes corrupt actors from government 
projects,125 as does the United States.126  Exclusion from custom with these institutions and 
governments is not inconsequential; these bodies are involved in trillions of dollars of projects 
each year.127 
117 World Bank Inst., Voices of the Misgoverned and Misruled: An Empirical Diagnostic Study on Governance, Rule 
of Law and Corruption for Peru, WORLD BANK 8–10 (Sept. 10, 2001), 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/206576/peru_voicesreport.pdf. 
118 WORLD BANK, DIAGNOSTIC SURVEYS OF CORRUPTION IN ROMANIA 19 (2001), available at 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/romenglish.pdf. 
119 TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION IN SOUTH ASIA: INSIGHTS AND BENCHMARKS FROM CITIZEN FEEDBACK 
SURVEYS IN FIVE COUNTRIES 16 (2002), available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan019883.pdf. 
120 Philip M. Nichols, George J. Siedel & Matthew Kasdin, Corruption as a Pan-Cultural Phenomenon: An 
Empirical Study in Countries at Opposite Ends of the Former Soviet Empire, 39 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 215, 231 (2004). 
121 Paul Temple & Georgy Petrov, Corruption in Higher Education: Some Findings from the States of the Former 
Soviet Union, 16 HIGHER EDUC. MGMT. POL’Y 83, 92 (2004). 
122 See generally Mark Kantor, International Project Finance and Arbitration with Public Sector Entities: When Is 
Arbitrability a Fiction?, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1122, 1126–46 (2001) (discussing difficulties faced by foreign 
companies in attempting to enforce relationships tainted by corruption from the Suharto era). 
123 See A. Timothy Brown, Corruption and Improper Payments: Global Trends and Applicable Law, 36 ALBERTA L. 
REV. 416, 436–37 (1998) (discussing debarment lists). 
124 World Bank Listing of Ineligible Firms & Individuals, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org (in search box, 
type “World Bank Listing of Ineligible Firms & Individuals”; then follow the first hyperlink). 
125 See Tong Xinchao, Chinese Procurement Law: Current Legal Frameworks and a Transition to the World Trade 
Organization’s Government Procurement Agreement, 17 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 139, 163–64 (2003) (describing 
the list and stating that firms may be kept on the list for one to three years). 
126 Federal Acquisitions Regulations System—Causes for Debarment, 48 C.F.R. § 9.406–2 (2011). 
127 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATE 
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2010 (2009) (estimating $3.55 trillion in 2010 U.S. expenditures); Projects & Lending, 
WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/ (in search box, type “Projects & Lending”; then click on first hyperlink) 
(placing World Bank lending for FY 2010 at $72 billion); Chinese Government Revenue and Trends, STARMASS 
INT’L, http://www.starmass.com/china_review/government_finance/government_ finance_trends.htm (last visited 
October 10, 2011) (citing Chinese government expenditures of ¥7630 billion, approximately US$1114.7 billion, in 
2009). 
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 Firms that pay bribes also severely constrict the number of foreign parties with whom 
they can form other relationships.  Several empirical studies have found that foreign investors 
avoid corrupt countries in general.  Paolo Mauro conducted one of the earliest of these studies.128 
He finds a “negative association between corruption and [foreign] investment, as well as growth, 
[that] is significant in both a statistical and an economic sense.”129  Numerous studies, using 
differing methodologies and sets of data, corroborate Mauro’s findings.  Victor M. Gastanaga, 
Jeffrey B. Nugent, and Bistra Pashamova, for example, examine corruption and other possible 
inhibitors of foreign investment in the context of the effects of government reforms and find that 
corruption diminishes foreign investment.130  Beata K. Smarzynska and Shang-Jin Wei use a 
finer data set, analyze from a firm level, focus particularly on the effects inside emerging 
economies, and find that “more corruption in a host country is associated with a lower 
probability of [foreign] investment.”131  Mohsin Habib and Leon Zurawicki find that corruption 
inhibits foreign investment but also find that the effect is amplified as the distance grows 
between the level of corruption in the host country and the home country of the investor.132  In 
other words, a firm located in a country with relatively high levels of corruption faces obstacles 
in forming investment relationships with foreign parties, and even greater obstacles creating 
investment relationships with foreign parties who are themselves not prone to act corruptly. 
 Many reasons probably explain the decision at the individual firm level to resist forming 
investment relationships in relatively more corrupt countries.  Corrupt relationships, as has been 
discussed in this article, impose direct costs; rational investors would choose to avoid those 
costs.133  Corruption creates an environment of opacity, obfuscation, and delay, which often 
128 Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681, 681 (1995); see also Earle & Cava, supra note 42, at 
67 (lauding Maoro). 
129 Mauro, supra note 128, at 705; see also Paolo Mauro, The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and 
Government Expenditure: A Cross Country Analysis, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 83, 91 (Kimberly 
Ann Elliott ed., 1997) (finding that a measurable decrease in corruption in a country would increase its investment to 
gross domestic product ratio by almost four percent and the annual growth of its gross domestic product per capita 
by almost half a percent). 
130 Victor M. Gastanaga et al., Host Country Reforms and FDI Inflows: How Much Difference Do They Make?, 26 
WORLD DEV. 1299, 1310–11 (1998). 
131 Beata K. Smarzynska & Shang-Jin Wei, Corruption and Composition of Foreign Investment: Firm Level 
Evidence (World Bank , Policy Research Working Paper No. 2360, 2000), available at 
http://library1.nida.ac.th/worldbankf/fulltext/wps02360.pdf. Smarzynska and Wei also find that foreign investors 
other than high tech companies are more likely to use the joint venture form to invest into more corrupt countries.  
Id. at 12. 
132 Mohsin Habib & Leon Zurawicki, Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment, 33 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 291, 303 
(2002). 
133 See Victor Dragotă et al., Some Considerations on the Relationship Between Corruption and Economic Growth, 
in RISK MANAGEMENT AND VALUE: VALUATION AND ASSET PRICING 71, 75 (Mondher Bellalah et al. eds., 2008) 
(noting this possibility but observing that investors are not always rational). 
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repels potential investors.134  Corruption creates uncertainty and instability, which discourages 
investment.135 
 All of these studies and observations treat the potential investment destination in the 
aggregate.  An individual firm located in a country with a relatively high level of corruption 
might think that because all potential investment partners outside of its country face these 
generic difficulties regardless of whether that particular company pays bribes, paying bribes will 
not cause further negative consequences.  Such reasoning, of course, is not correct: at the local 
level a firm that pays bribes has greater costs and uses resources less effectively, and it would 
probably be unattractive to a foreign firm on that basis alone.  Regardless, one factor that repels 
foreign relationships does so at the firm level and absolutely flows from the actions of the 
individual firm: liability. 
 The next section of this article discusses criminal liability as a consequence of the 
payment of a bribe.  Criminal liability for the payment of bribes can be severe.136  Firms 
understandably seek to avoid those penalties and seek to avoid relationships that will expose 
them to liability.  Indeed, a survey of international businesses commissioned by Deloitte found 
that in one year nearly two-thirds of those firms had abandoned projects involving the creation of 
an international relationship due to concerns over potential liability for the payment of bribes.137  
A great number of relationships can create such exposure. 
 The United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act138 imposes criminal liability for the 
payment or offer of bribes to foreign officials.  As it is one of the older laws imposing such 
liability, it serves well as an illustration of the extent to which relationships with corrupt actors 
can extend liability.139  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act generally extends jurisdiction over 
U.S. firms and individuals for their own actions.140  U.S. entities can, however, also be held 
liable for the actions of parties with whom they have certain relationships.  When a U.S. firm 
acquires, merges with, or in some cases even acquires the assets of a foreign firm, it also assumes 
134 Gastanaga et al., supra note 130, at 1301; Habib & Zurawicki, supra note 132, at 292. 
135 Barbara Crutchfield George & Kathleen A. Lacey, A Coalition of Industrialized Nations, Developing Nations, 
Multilateral Development Banks, and Non-Governmental Organizations: A Pivotal Complement to Current Anti-
Corruption Initiatives, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 547, 590 (2000). 
136 See infra notes 177–231 and accompanying text (discussing penalties). 
137 DELOITTE FINANCIAL ADVISORY SERVICES LLC, LOOK BEFORE YOU LEAP: MANAGING RISK IN GLOBAL 
INVESTMENTS 7 (2011), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedStates/Local%20Content/Articles/Financial%20Advisory%20Services/us_fas_Look%20Before%20You%20
Leap_012711.pdf [hereinafter DELOITTE]. 
138 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C. § 78), amended by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78), and International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-366 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78). 
139 Some mistakenly believe that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act had no analogs.  In fact, Sweden also enacted a 
law that prohibited the bribery of foreign officials. See David R. Slade, Comment, Foreign Corrupt Payments: 
Enforcing a Multilateral Agreement, 22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 117, 122 n.22 (1981) (discussing the statute, an 
amendment to the Swedish Penal Code).  The law, however, was drafted in a manner that made application of 
jurisdiction very difficult.  See generally Michael Bogdan, International Trade and the New Swedish Provisions on 
Corruption, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 665 (1979) (evaluating and criticizing the law). 
140 As explained in the next section, the United States also extends jurisdiction over a number of foreign actors.  See 
infra Part IV. 
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exposure for criminal liability for bribes that that foreign firm has paid.141  Parent companies can 
often be found criminally liable for bribes paid by subsidiaries, on the theory that the parent is 
aware or constructively aware of the bribe;142 U.S. firms can even be found liable for bribes paid 
by foreign firms in which they own large percentages of shares.143 Parent companies can be held 
criminally liable for bribes paid by agents of subsidiaries.144  U.S. firms are criminally liable for 
bribes paid by employees or agents.145  U.S. firms are also liable for bribes paid by any third 
party or intermediary acting on behalf of the U.S. firm.146  Justin Marceau predicts that U.S. 
franchisors will be found criminally liable, when constructive knowledge can be established, for 
bribes paid by foreign franchisees.147  Debra Maryanov points out that because the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act imposes criminal liability for payments to third parties if the U.S. firm 
knows or constructively knows that some or all of that payment will be used to pay a bribe, then 
U.S. firms can be held criminally liable for payments made to suppliers if they constructively 
know that those suppliers use part of the payment to fund bribes.148 
 Given the severe criminal liability that can accrue simply from entering into a 
relationship with a bribe payer, U.S. firms are advised to be extremely cautious about entering 
into relationships.149  U.S. firms are not alone.  Most of the major trading countries in the world 
have enacted similar legislation.150  As just one example, the German Criminal Code states that 
141 See H. Lowell Brown, Successor Corporate Criminal Liability: The Emerging Federal Common Law, 49 ARK. L. 
REV. 469, 477–82 (1996) (discussing criminal liability for successor companies); Daniel J. Grimm, The Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act in Merger and Acquisition Transactions: Successor Liability and Its Consequences, 7 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & BUS. 247, 252–53 (2010) (pointing out the SEC’s recent attention to mergers and acquisitions); Carolyn 
Lindsey, More than You Bargained for: Successor Liability Under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 35 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 959, 966 (2009) (noting liability for predecessor’s violations).  H. Lowell Brown points out that 
attempting to circumvent successor liability through creative transactions rarely succeeds. Brown, supra, at 484–99. 
142 H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 
18-19 (1998); Barbara Crutchfield George & Kathleen A. Lacey, Investigation of Halliburton Co./TSKJ’s Nigerian 
Business Practices: Model for Analysis of the Current Anti-Corruption Environment on Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503, 516–17 (2006).  A parent is constructively aware if, among 
other things, it actively ignores important facts, the corrupt payment is recorded on the subsidiary’s books, or the 
subsidiary repeatedly pays bribes.  Brown, supra, at 31, 37–38. 
143 See Justin F. Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, A Little More Action: Evaluating and Forecasting the Trend 
of More Frequent and Severe Prosecutions Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 285, 305 (2007) (describing such liability and explaining that constructive knowledge of the bribe must be 
demonstrated). 
144 Brown, supra note 142, at 18-19. 
145 Id. at 35–36; Anupam Chander, Googling Freedom, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 41 (2011); Marceau, supra note 143, at 
298–300. 
146 Marceau, supra note 143, at 298; Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The 
Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 545 (2011). 
147 Marceau, supra note 143, at 302. 
148 Debra Cohen Maryanov, Sweatshop Liability: Corporate Codes of Conduct and the Governance of Labor 
Standards in the International Supply Chain, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 397, 441-42 (2010). 
149 DELOITTE, supra note 137, at 3; Lindsey, supra note 141, at 982-83. 
150 See infra Table 1 (discussing legislation). 
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“[w]hoever commits the crime himself or through another shall be punished as a perpetrator.”151  
Germany has explicitly warned that this provision will be used to hold German companies liable 
for bribes paid by related parties outside of Germany.152  Bulgaria imposes administrative rather 
than criminal liability on artificial persons.153  The actions of employees, agents, representatives, 
or firms to which the Bulgarian firm has a connection expose Bulgarian firms to administrative 
liability;154 Bulgaria has made clear that this liability extends to the payment of bribes.155  These 
are but two examples of the general point: business firms expose themselves to risk when they 
enter into relationships with firms that pay bribes, which engenders reluctance on the part of 
those firms to enter into relationships with firms that pay bribes. 
 When, therefore, a firm pays a bribe, it precludes itself from entering into relationships 
with a vast number of transnational entities.  Precluding these relationships is not 
inconsequential.  The extent to which a relationship with a foreign business will benefit any 
particular firm depends on complex interactions of idiosyncratic characteristics.156  In general, 
however, relationships with foreign entities often represent the most effective means of acquiring 
new machineries or technologies,157 developing and implementing management and governance 
skills,158 creating broader networks of relationships,159 and accessing capital.160  A firm that pays 
bribes risks cutting itself off from factors that will allow it to grow and to flourish in the future. 
 
 
IV.  CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
 
151 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL. I] 945, as 
amended, § 25(1) (Ger.), translation available at Criminal Code (Strafgesetzenbuch, StGB), COMP. L. SOC’Y, 
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.htm. 
152 Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [OECD], Germany: Phase 3: Report on the Application of the Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 2009 Revised 
Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, at 18-19 (Mar. 17, 2011), available 
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/45/47416623.pdf. 
153 Administrative liability results in fines and debarment. OECD, Bulgaria: Phase 3 Report on the Application of 
the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 
2009 Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, at 9 (Mar. 18, 2011), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/20/47468296.pdf 
154 LAW ON ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENCES AND SANCTIONS art. 83a(1)-(2) (Bulg.). 
155 OECD, supra note 153, at 10. 
156 Klaus E. Meyer & Evis Sinani, When and Where Does Foreign Direct Investment Generate Positive Spillovers? 
A Meta-Analysis, 40 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 1075, 1076 (2009). 
157 Kamal Saggi, Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and International Technology Transfer: A Survey, 17 WORLD 
BANK RES. OBS. 191, 228–29 (2002). 
158 OLIVIER BLANCHARD, THE ECONOMICS OF POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITION 77–88 (1997). 
159 Robert E. Lipsey, Home- and Host-Country Effects of Foreign Direct Investment, in CHALLENGES TO 
GLOBALIZATION: ANALYZING THE ECONOMICS 333, 365 (Robert E. Baldwin & L. Alan Winters eds., 2002). 
160 Sophia P. Dimelis, Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment and Firm Growth: Technological, Financial and 
Market Structure Effects, 12 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 85, 85–87 (2005). 
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When considering the consequences of paying a bribe, a person or firm must take into account 
the potential for criminal sanction.161  Criminal sanctions adhere to bribery through at least two 
frameworks: through local laws and through laws sanctioning the bribery of foreign public 
officials.  Not every jurisdiction imposes criminal liability on legal persons, although a growing 
number of countries do so.162  This article speaks generally of criminal liability and tries to 
include both real persons and firms when it is appropriate to do so. 
 
A.  Local Law 
 
Virtually every country in the world criminalizes the bribery of its own officials.163  Albania, for 
example, prohibits payments to a government official “to have him act or refrain from acting on 
an action connected to his duty or service, or to use his influence toward other authorities in 
order to insure favors, courtesies and any other benefits.”164  Zambia, more verbosely, imposes 
criminal penalties on 
 
[a]ny person who by himself, or by or in conjunction with any other person, corruptly 
gives, promises or offers any gratification to any public officer, whether for the benefit of 
that public officer or of any other public officer, as an inducement or reward for doing or 
forbearing to do, anything in relation to any matter or transaction, actual or proposed, 
with which any public body is or may be concerned.165   
 
Persons who pay a bribe in Albania or Zambia or any country in between166 expose themselves 
to a risk of criminal liability. 
161 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (stating that a rational actor considers costs of criminal penalties); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and 
Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 55 (2005) (stating that actors take potential costs 
of criminal sanctions into account). 
162 See Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1482 
(2009) (noting that many jurisdictions are creating corporate criminal liability); Edward B. Diskant, Note, 
Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine Through Comparative 
Criminal Procedure, 118 YALE L.J. 126, 129 (2008) (noting that not all countries impose criminal liability on 
artificial persons).  Whether corporate criminal liability should exist raises complicated issues not addressed in this 
article other than to note that, regardless of whether it should exist, it is widely imposed on companies that have paid 
bribes.  For a discussion on the complexities of corporate criminal liability, see generally William S. Laufer & Alan 
Strudler, Corporate Crime and Making Amends, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1307 (2007). 
163 Hess & Dunfee, supra note 3, at 613; Vega, supra note 9, at 391. 
164 CRIMINAL CODE [CRIM. C.] art. 245 (Alb.). 
165 Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 1996, Cap. 91, 7 LAWS OF REP. OF ZAMBIA (2006) § 29(2). 
166 Alphabetically (in English), Afghanistan precedes Albania and Zimbabwe follows Zambia; each of these 
countries, however, is experiencing profound change and their laws may be in a state of flux.  Nonetheless, both 
criminalize bribery.  Afghanistan for the moment still uses a penal code enacted in 1976.  See PENAL CODE, 
OFFICIAL GAZETTE NO. 347 (Afg.).  Chapter Three of that code lays out extensive provisions regarding bribery.  The 
law prohibits giving or promising to give “any money, good or other benefit . . . for the purpose of performance of 
or abstention from or disruption of a duty which is assigned to him.”  Arts. 254–55.  Afghan law also prohibits an 
interesting version of bribery: “A person who forces an official of public services though oral or material pressure to 
do an unrightful work, or hinders the performance of his job obligation or disrupts it, shall be considered as briber 
and shall be sentenced to its fixed punishment.”  Art. 257.  As part of the nation-building process in Afghanistan, 
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 Some countries do not enforce these laws with vigor, which may lead some firms to 
believe that the risk of prosecution equals zero.  Such thinking grossly miscalculates the risk.  In 
general, current failure to enforce a given law does not drain that law of its legal vitality.167  
Prosecution for violation of a generally unenforced statute always remains a possibility.168  
Indeed, aggressive prosecutors can use rarely enforced laws to target or harass people or firms 
for which they have some degree of animus.169  Historically, prosecutors have used corruption 
laws to target persons or entities.170 
 There is good reason to be especially sensitive to the possibility of prosecution for 
payment of a bribe.  Laws sometimes lapse into unenforced status because they no longer, or 
never did, align with underlying social norms.171  These statutes are left in criminal codes 
because the transaction costs of removing them exceed the burden imposed on the general 
public172 of leaving them in the codes.173  Prosecutorial discretion aligns the lack of enforcement 
with extant norms, which minimizes the public’s impulses to repeal these laws.174 
Italy has taken the lead role in a United Nations project to reform Afghan law and build legal capacity; the eventual 
status of the Penal Code is unclear.  M. Cherif Bassiouni & Daniel Rothenberg, An Assessment of Justice Sector and 
Rule of Law Reform in Afghanistan and the Need for a Comprehensive Plan 10 (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://www.law.depaul.edu/centers_institutes/ihrli/pdf/rome_conference.pdf.  At the time of the writing of this 
article , Zimbabwe is in a chaotic state while the military junta that has backed President Robert Mugabe’s attempts 
to comprehend the democratic impulses that have overtaken the nation.  See Jeremiah I. Williamson, Note, Seeking 
Civilian Control: Rule of Law, Democracy, and Civil-Military Relations in Zimbabwe, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 389, 401-11 (2010) (describing contestation of law in Zimbabwe). Zimbabwe’s current criminal code, 
promulgated in 2004, prohibits bribery of public officials.  Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [ch. 9:23], 
June 3, 2005, art. 170(1)(b) (Zim.). 
167 Alexander Black turns to Shakespeare:  “The law hath not been dead, though it hath slept.”  Alexander J. Black, 
Legal Principles Surrounding the New Canadian and American Arctic Energy Debate, 23 ENERGY L.J. 81, 110 
(2002) (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 2, sc. 2).   
168 LON FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 108 (1949). 
169 See Linda Fitts Mischler, Personal Morals Masquerading as Professional Ethics: Regulations Banning Sex 
Between Domestic Relations Attorneys and Their Clients, 23 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 25 (2000) (describing 
potential aggressive uses of rarely enforced laws); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 
1011 (1995) (condemning the use of unenforced laws for harassment). 
170 Indeed, much of the consternation over the recent prosecution of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko of 
Ukraine stems from a concern that her prosecution is politically motivated.  See David M. Herszenhorn, New 
Charges Against Ex-Leader of Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2011, at A9 (discussing the prosecution of 
Tymeshenko and reaction in other countries). 
171 See Melissa J. Mitchell, Comment, Cleaning Out the Closet: Using Sunset Provisions to Clean up Cluttered 
Criminal Codes, 54 EMORY L.J. 1671, 1675–77 (2005). 
172 Of course, a distinct class of people may be significantly burdened by unenforced laws.  See Christopher R. 
Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Unenforced" Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 
110 (2000) (arguing that even unenforced laws are not harmless because they create a criminal class). 
173 See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Essay, The Price of Prohibition, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 9 (1994) 
(“Repealing statutes has its costs. These costs might be very low when a statute forbids widely practiced behavior 
generally regarded as harmless to society. But the benefits of repealing these statutes are nonexistent. Such statutes 
remain on the books by default, bothering few, if any, people.”). 
174 Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the Constitutional 
Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 150 n.192 (1993); Mitchell, supra note 171, at 1681. 
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 The opposite is true of bribery laws.  Rather than functioning to accurately reflect extant 
norms, the lack of enforcement of bribery laws occurs because of a malfunction in the legal 
process.175  The general public deeply despises corruption and perceives the failure to enforce 
corruption laws as a problem.176  The nonenforcement of bribery laws, therefore, occurs due to a 
malfunction of the process of law; to the extent that the quality of law improves or a different 
malfunction occurs, then the likelihood of prosecutions of bribery should change and the risk of 
criminal punishment could increase substantially. 
 The penalties imposed for bribery vary but generally involve imprisonment and fines.  
Some countries impose the death penalty for bribery.177  Albania, referenced above, imposes an 
unspecified fine and imprisonment of up to five years;178 Zambia requires disgorgement of the 
benefit and imposes a prison sentence of up to twelve years.179  Table 1 outlines the criminal 
penalties for simple bribery180 of domestic public officials in polities that are among the twenty 
most active in international trade or are among the twenty greatest destinations for inward 
foreign investment181—in other words, countries with which an international businessperson is 
most likely to interact. 
 
Table 1: Criminal Penalties for Bribery of Domestic Public Officials 
Country Imprisonment Fine Corp. Liability 
Australia182 up to 10 years statutory yes183 
175 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Descending Trail: Holmes’ Path of the Law One Hundred Years Later, 49 FLA. L. 
REV. 353, 367-69 (1997) (distinguishing between nonenforcement of law by well-functioning systems and 
nonenforcement due to malfunction of systems). 
176 See supra notes 114-122 and accompanying text. 
177 See John Dugard & Christine Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 
187, 194 n.58 (1998) (discussing imposition of the death penalty for bribery); Frank E. Vogel, The Trial of 
Terrorists Under Classical Islamic Law, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 60-61 (2002) (discussing the application of the 
death penalty to corrupt acts under Islamic law).  But see Matthew Bloom, Note, A Comparative Analysis of the 
United States’s Response to Extradition Requests from China, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 177, 194 (2008) (stating that 
China is considering abolition of the death penalty for corruption crimes so that European nations will be more 
likely to honor extradition requests). 
178 CRIM. C. art. 245 (Alb.). 
179 Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 1996, Cap. 91, 7 LAWS OF REP. OF ZAMBIA (2006) art. 41.  Afghanistan, 
referenced above, supra note 166, imposes a prison sentence of two to ten years and a fine equal to the bribe. PENAL 
CODE, OFFICIAL GAZETTE NO. 347 art 255 (Afg.).  The bribe itself will be confiscated.  Art. 262.  Zimbabwe 
imposes a prison sentence of not more than twelve years and a fine not greater than three times the amount of the 
bribe. Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [ch. 9:23], June 3, 2005, art. 170(1)(b) (Zim.). 
180 Some jurisdictions apply additional penalties for bribery of specific officials, or for bribery that occurs in specific 
circumstances. 
181 This list is based on International Monetary Fund estimates for 2010.  See Coordinated Direct Investment Survey, 
INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://cdis.imf.org/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2011)  (listing country-specific data). 
182 Criminal Code of 1995 (Cth) pt 7.6, div. 141.1(5) (Austl.). 
183 Id. pt 2.5 div 12.1. 
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Belgium184 6 months to 5 years not specified yes185 
Brazil186 2 to 12 years not specified no187 
Canada188 up to 5 years not specified yes189 
China190 according to 
seriousness191 
unlimited for legal 
persons 
yes 
France192 up to 10 years €150,000 yes193 
Germany194 3 months to 10 years not specified yes195 
Hong Kong196 up to 10 years up to HK$500,000 possible197 
India198 up to 1 year unlimited yes199 
184 Loi relative à la répression de la corruption [Bribery Prevention Act] of Feb. 10, 1999, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] 
[Official Gazette of Belgium], Mar. 23, 1999, 9281. 
185 CODE PÉNAL [C.PÉN.] art. 5 (Belg.). 
186 CÓDIGO PENAL [C.P.] art. 317(6) (Braz.). 
187 Draft Bill number 6826/2010, submitted to the Brazilian legislature in 2010, imposes criminal liability on legal 
persons for the crime of bribery. See OECD, Steps Taken to Implement and Enforce the OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions: Brazil, at 2 (June 6, 2011), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/25/42097321.pdf. 
188 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 121(3) (Can.). 
189  Id. ss. 22.1, 22.2. 
190 Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa [Criminal Law] (promulgated by the Fifth National People’s Congress, 
Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997),  art. 389 (China). 
191 Sentences can include life imprisonment. Id. art. 390. 
192 Loi 2000-595 du 30 juin 2000 modifiant le code pénal et le code de procédure pénale relative à la lutte contre la 
corruption [Law 2000-595 of June 30, 2000 Amending the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure 
Relating to the Fight Against Corruption], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZEETTE OF FRANCE], July 1, 2000, p. 9944. 
193 CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 121-22 (Fr.). 
194 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL. I] 945, as 
amended, §§334-35 (Ger.). 
195 Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz [OWiG] [Administrative Offences Act], May 24, 1968, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL 
I [BGBL. I] (Ger.).  Germany has long resisted imposing criminal liability on legal persons, instead imposing nearly 
identical penalties through an administrative process.  See Joanna Kyriakakis, Corporate Criminal Liability and the 
ICC Statute: The Comparative Law Challenge, 56 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 333, 343–44 (2009). 
196 Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 201, §12(1)(9) (H.K.). 
197 Courts in Hong Kong have begun to impose criminal liability on corporations, although not yet for crimes 
involving bribery.  See Melanie Pritchard, Corporate Manslaughter: The Dawning of a New Era?, 27 H.K. L.J. 40, 
55–57 (1997). 
198 Punishment for Birbery, No. 39 of 1920, PEN. CODE (1975), § 171E (India). 
199 The Indian Supreme Court has ruled that corporations can be held criminally liable, although this holding has not 
been applied to bribery.  Standard Chartered Bank and Others v. Directorate of Enforcement, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 2622 
(India). 
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Ireland200 up to 10 years unlimited yes201 
Italy202 6 months to 5 years203 not specified yes204 
Japan205 up to 3 years, & hard 
labor 
up to ¥2,500,000 no206 
Mexico207 up to 14 years not specified no208 
Netherlands209 up to 12 years €760,000210 yes211 
Russia212 up to 8 years yes213 yes214 
Saudi Arabia215 up to 10 years Riyal 1,000,000 no 
Singapore216 up to 7 years up to S$100,000 yes217 
200 Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act of 2001 (Act No. 27/2001) (Ir.), available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2001/en.act.2001.0027.pdf. 
201 Id. s. 9. 
202 CODICE PENALE [C.p.] art. 322 (It.). 
203 Italy distinguishes between bribery to induce a public official to perform a legal act, for which the penalty is 
imprisonment for between six months and two years, and bribery to induce a public official to commit an illegal act, 
for which the penalty is imprisonment for between two years and five years.  See id. 
204 Like Germany, Italy imposes administrative rather than criminal liability on artificial persons for crimes 
including bribery.  See Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western Europe Tell Us About 
American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 131 (2004). 
205 KEIHŌ [KEIHŌ] [PEN. C.] art. 198 (Japan). 
206 Japan does in some circumstances impose criminal liability on legal persons for bribery of foreign officials. 
OECD, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Japan, at 17 (Dec. 2011), available 
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/51/49377330.pdf. 
207 Codigo Penal Federal [CFP] [Federal Criminal Code], as amended Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DO], Oct. 24, 
2011, art. 222 (Mex.). 
208 Mexico does impose criminal liability on legal persons for bribery of foreign officials. Id. art 222 bis. 
209 WETBOEK VAN STRAFRECHT [SR] §178 (Neth.). 
210 The Netherlands also confiscates the proceeds of the transaction.  Id. 
211 Id. § 51. 
212 UGOLOVNYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code] art. 291 (Russ.). 
213 The fine levied will be two hundred to one thousand times the current minimum wage or an amount equal to 
between seven and twelve months of the income of the bribing person.  Id. 
214 KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII RF OB ADMINISTRATIVNYKH PRAVONARUSHENIIAKH [KOAP RF] [Code of 
Administrative Violations] art. 19.28 (Russ.). 
215 Combating Bribery Law, Official Gazette No. 3414, art. 1 (July 31, 1992) (Saudi Arabia), reprinted in Saudi 
Arabia: Anti-Bribery Law, 9 ARAB L.Q. 283 (1994). 
216 Prevention of Corruption Act, ch. 241, §7 (1960) (Sing.). 
217 Id. §§ 10-12. 
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South Korea218 up to 5 years up to ₩20,000,000 yes219 
Spain220 up to 10 years 10 x benefit of transaction yes221 
Sweden222 up to 2 years statutory possible223 
Switzerland224 up to 5 years unlimited yes225 
Taiwan226 1 to 7 years TWD 3,000,000 no 
United 
Kingdom227 
up to 7 years unlimited yes228 
United States229 up to 15 years230 3 x benefit obtained yes231 
 
 The number of years a person may spend in prison for paying a bribe varies in different 
jurisdictions, as does the amount of money a firm may pay as a fine.  In some jurisdictions an 
actor may perceive the risk of detection and prosecution as low.  The risk, however, is never zero 
and a firm contemplating paying a bribe must always understand that criminal sanction is a 
potential consequence. 
 
218 Hyongpop [Criminal Code],  art. 133(1) (S. Kor.) 
219 See Young-Cheol Jeong, Legal Compliance and Korea’s Financial Services Market: A Strategic Approach, 20 
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 483, 518 (2011) (describing the creation of sentencing guidelines that apply criminal 
sanctions on legal persons for the crime of bribery). 
220 CÓDIGO PENAL [C.P.] [Criminal Code] art. 423 (Sp.). 
221 Like Germany and Italy, Spain imposes administrative rather than criminal liability.  See David Scheffer & 
Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort 
Statute and the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 334, 370 (2011). 
222 17 ch. 7 § LAG OM ÄNDRING I BROTTSBALKEN (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 2004:404) (Swed.). 
223 Liability similar to criminal liability may be imposed on legal persons through a variety of avenues; these 
mechanisms are not specifically aimed at bribery.  See Diane Marie Amann, Capital Punishment: Corporate 
Criminal Liability for Gross Violations of Human Rights, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 327, 332 (2001). 
224 CODE PÉNAL SUISSE [CP] [CRIMINAL CODE], RS 311.0,  art. 322ter (Switz.). 
225 CP, art.102 (Switz.). 
226 Anticorruption Statute art. 11 (Taiwan), http://mojlaw.moj.gov.tw/LawContentE.aspx?id=FL001430. 
227 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., c. 69, § 2 (Eng.).  The United Kingdom has 
strengthened its laws controlling transnational corruption, see infra notes 266–275 and accompanying text, and may 
amend its regulations controlling domestic bribery. 
228 The United Kingdom recently circumscribed the criminal liability of legal persons; it is not clear whether this 
will affect corporate liability for bribery.  See Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1495 (2009) (discussing the circumscription of criminal liability of legal 
persons in the United Kingdom). 
229 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006). 
230 The United States distinguishes between bribes paid to induce a public official to engage in fraud or misconduct 
and bribes paid to induce a public official to commit a legal act.  The maximum term of imprisonment for the latter 
is two years, although the fine continues to be three times the benefit obtained. Id. §201(c). 
231 See Robert Zachary Beasley, Note, A Legislative Solution: Solving the Contemporary Challenge of Forced 
Waiver of Privilege, 86 TEX. L. REV. 385, 385 (2007) (discussing criminal liability for bribery). 
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B.  Laws Prohibiting Bribery of Foreign Officials 
 
 A person or firm that pays a bribe also exposes itself to prosecution under extraterritorial 
laws forbidding payments of bribes.  Generally, these laws prohibit bribery of foreign officials, 
but in operation they could apply to a local firm or person who bribes a local official.232 
 For many years the United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was the best known of 
these types of laws, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act still shapes the behaviors of many 
transnational businesses.233  Dozens of practice guides provide detailed discussion of the 
operation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act;234 this article leaves discussion of the intricacies 
of the Act to those guides and instead focuses on the risk of negative consequences for the act of 
paying a bribe.  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prohibits firms or persons from directly or 
indirectly paying or offering to pay anything of value to foreign officials in order to obtain or 
retain business.235  Violations can result in fines of up to two million U.S. dollars for each 
violation and, for individual actors, imprisonment for up to five years.236  Additional penalties 
administered by the government include forfeiture of government licenses, debarment from 
government contracts, and disgorgement of profits connected to the bribes.237  The United States 
Department of Justice and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), administrators of the 
Act, do not easily succumb to ruses intended to shield a firm from liability; bribes paid through 
232 The law reaches, for example, bribe-paying local agents of firms connected to the United States.  Rollo C. Baker, 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 647, 657–58 (2010). 
233 See Joan T.A. Gabel et al., Letter vs. Spirit: The Evolution of Compliance into Ethics, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 453, 460–
61 (2009) (suggesting that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act effectuated a fundamental change in corporate culture); 
Philip M. Nichols, Who Allows Facilitating Payments?, 14 AGORA WITHOUT FRONTIERS 303, 315 (2009) (finding 
the policies of many companies located outside of the United States to be shaped by the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act). 
234 For examples of the literally hundreds of guidance pieces for practitioners, see DONALD ZARIN, DOING BUSINESS 
UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (1995); Adam Fremantle & Sherman Katz, The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Amendments of 1988, 23 INT’L LAW. 755 (1989); John E. Impert, A Program for Compliance with the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Foreign Law Restrictions on the Use of Sales Agents, 24 INT’L LAW. 1009 
(1990); James L. McCulloch & Christina Maria Abascal Deboben, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Other 
Legal Considerations Relevant to the Oil and Gas Industry in Latin America, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1075 (2003); Cherie 
O. Taylor, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Primer, 17 CURRENTS INT’L TRADE L.J. 3 (2008).  For examples 
of scholarly analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, see Earle, supra note 17; Barbara Crutchfield George et 
al., The 1998 OECD Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitude Toward Corruption in Business 
Transactions, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 511–12 (2000); Kathleen A. Lacey et al., Assessing the Deterrent Effect of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s Certification Provisions: A Comparative Analysis Using the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 397 (2005); Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global 
Harmony, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 419 (1999); Bill Shaw, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Progeny: Morally 
Unassailable, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 689 (2000). 
235 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -3(a) (2006); see also Gabel et al., supra note 233, at 459-60 (discussing 
prohibitions). 
236 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g), -3(e); see also Kyle P. Sheahen, I’m Not Going to Disneyland: Illusory Affirmative 
Defenses Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 464, 468 (2010) (discussing penalties and 
noting that the “stakes [are] high”). 
237 See Baker, supra note 232, at 669; Taylor, supra note 234, at 7; David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing 
Proportionality, Retribution, and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 474–75, 484–87 (2009). 
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third parties or payments made with a purposeful lack of knowledge of purpose expose a firm to 
liability.238 
 Jurisdiction under the Act extends to U.S. firms, citizens, and residents; to firms with 
securities listed on a U.S. exchange or registered with the SEC, as well as firms required to file 
reports with the SEC; to employees and agents of firms subject to jurisdiction; and to persons 
involved in the payment of bribes, any part of which includes conduct that is connected to the 
territory of the United States—including, for example, an e-mail sent to a party in the United 
States or a payment that includes routing through a bank in the United States.239  Amy 
Westbrook even suggests that the United States may extend jurisdiction if the payment of a bribe 
affects markets in the United States.240  Any person or firm evaluating the potential 
consequences of paying a bribe must take into account the broad reach of the United States’ 
jurisdiction, which includes persons and firms outside of the United States.241  As Mike Koehler 
notes, “the undeniable fact [is] that FCPA risk is omnipresent.”242 
 A person evaluating the potential consequences of paying a bribe must also understand 
that many countries have enacted laws similar to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. More than 
fifty countries criminalize bribery of foreign officials.  These countries are listed in Table 2.243   
 
Table 2: Countries that Criminalize Bribery of Foreign Officials 
238 See Marceau, supra note 143, at 296–97; Thomas R. Snider & Won Kidane, Combating Corruption Through 
International Law in Africa: A Comparative Analysis, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 691, 720–21 (2007). 
239 The U.S. Department of Justice explicitly makes this sweeping claim of jurisdiction.  See Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act: An Overview, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ criminal/fraud/fcpa/ (last visited Oct. 13, 
2011).  Scholars have also commented on the broad jurisdiction afforded the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  See H. 
Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1998 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 
Does the Government’s Reach Now Exceed its Grasp?, 26 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 239, 291–358 (2001); 
Westbrook, supra note 146, at 552–53. 
240 Westbrook, supra note 146, at 553–54. 
241 See Brown, supra note 239, at 291–92 (discussing jurisdictional amendments to the FCPA); Barbara Crutchfield 
George et al., On the Threshold of the Adoption of Global Antibribery Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current 
Domestic and International Efforts Toward the Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 
14–16 (1999) (discussing SEC enforcement over foreign corporations and top executives); Mike Koehler, The 
Unique FCPA Compliance Challenges of Doing Business in China, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 397, 418 & n.87 (2007) 
(discussing a FCPA enforcement action against an international oil company). 
242 Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. 
REV. 389, 396 (2010). 
243 This table uses information from the Organization of American States, the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Transparency International, and sources cited infra notes 246–247. 
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Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Dominican Republic 
El Salvador 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Luxemburg 
Mexico 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Norway 
Panama 
Peru 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russia 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
South Korea  
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
 
More countries will join this list.  Several international organizations require members to 
criminalize transnational bribery.  The African Union, for example, has promulgated the African 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption,244 which requires members to prohibit 
bribery of foreign officials;245 forty-five members have signed the convention and thirty-one 
have ratified it.246  The Organization of American States also requires members to criminalize 
transnational bribery.247 
 The laws enacted by these countries share with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act the 
characteristic of criminalizing transnational bribery.  The Russian law, signed into effect in the 
spring of 2011, criminalizes bribery of foreign officials in connection with international 
business; the law applies to both legal and natural persons and imposes large fines for 
violations.248  Also enacted as of the spring of 2011, the anti-bribery legislation of the People’s 
Republic of China includes a provision imposing criminal liability for bribes paid or offered to 
244 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, opened for signature July 11, 2003, 43 
I.L.M. 5. 
245 See James Forole Jarso, The Media and the Anti-Corruption Crusade in Kenya: Weighing the Achievements, 
Challenges, and Prospects, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 33, 42 (2011) (discussing provisions of the African Union 
Convention). 
246 See List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption, AFRICAN UNION (June 8, 2010), http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/documents/treaties/List/African%20Convention%20on%20Combating%20Corruption.pdf. 
247 See Amanda Boote & Anne H. Dechter, Slipped Up: Model Rule 2.1 and Counseling Clients on the “Grease 
Payments” Exception to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 471, 485 (2010) (discussing 
the Organization of American States and other conventions requiring the criminalization of transnational bribery). 
248 Andrew E. Kramer, Russia Is Invited to Join O.E.C.D. Anti-Bribery Pact, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2011, at B4. 
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foreign officials in order to seek an unjust commercial benefit.249  The law applies to natural and 
legal persons, including joint ventures.  Penalties for violations of this law include imprisonment 
for up to ten years as well as fines.250  China has not yet had time to demonstrate the vigor with 
which it will enforce this law; the central government of China, however, has in general 
demonstrated a commitment to prosecuting corruption cases.251 
 Many of the laws criminalizing bribery of foreign officials have broader jurisdictional 
application than even that of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  Hungary, for example, not only 
extends jurisdiction to bribes paid within Hungary’s territory or by Hungarian citizens and 
companies abroad,252 but it also may prosecute nonnationals for the payment (or receipt) of 
bribes if the conduct is a crime in the place where it occurred.253  In other words, Hungary’s 
courts may extend jurisdiction over a person who pays a bribe to a foreign official almost any 
place in the world, regardless of any substantial connection to Hungary.254  Iceland extends 
jurisdiction to acts that have a substantial connection to the territory of Iceland, but will also 
prosecute a person apprehended on the territory of Iceland even if the bribe had no connection to 
Iceland.255  At the discretion of the King, the antibribery law of Norway can be extended to non-
Norwegian nationals for acts committed entirely outside of Norway.256 
 The breadth of behaviors prohibited by many of these laws also exceeds that of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  The Act, for example, famously exempts “facilitating payments” 
(bribes paid to secure nondiscretionary government actions).257  The same is not true of myriad 
other laws that criminalize bribes paid to foreign officials.258  Mexico, for example, does not 
provide an exception for facilitating payments,259 nor does Luxembourg260 or Japan.261  The 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act applies only to bribes paid to obtain or retain business; many 
249 Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa [Criminal Law] (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, Feb. 25, 2011, effective May 1, 2011),  art. 164 (China). 
250 Id.   
251 See China Demonstrates Intent to Clean up Corruption Through Law Change, TRUSTLAW (Mar. 23, 2011, 
12:18PM), http://www.trust.org/trustlaw/news/china-demonstrates-intent-to-clean-up-corruption-through-law-
change/ (discussing the new foreign bribery law and the Chinese commitment to prosecuting corruption cases). 
252 See Büntetó Törvénykönyv [BTK] [Criminal Code] tit. VIII, § 258B, para. 3(1) (Hung.). 
253 Id. § 258B, para. 4(1)(a). 
254 See Christopher F. Corr & Judd Lawler, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t?  The OECD Convention and 
the Globalization of Anti-Bribery, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1249, 1314 n.448 (1999) (stating that Hungary’s 
jurisdictional reach is “of particular interest”). 
255 See ICELANDIC GENERAL PENAL CODE, Law. No. 147/1998, §§ 5–6 (Ice.). 
256 See PENAL CODE §§ 12.4, 13 (Nor.).  This provision applies to all criminal acts; the provisions criminalizing 
bribery of foreign officials can be found at § 276a. 
257 See Alexandros Zervos, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Repealing the Exemption for “Routine 
Government Action” Payments, 25 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 251, 263–69 (2006) (discussing the exemption). 
258 See Nichols, supra note 233, at 310. 
259 See Codigo Penal Federal [CFP] [Federal Criminal Code], as amended Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DO], Oct. 
24, 2011, art. 222 bis (Mex.). 
260 See CRIMINAL CODE arts. 247–51 (Lux.). 
261 See KEIHŌ [KEIHŌ] [PEN. C.] art. 10 bis (2) (Japan).  
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countries criminalize any bribe paid to a foreign official.  The Czech Republic,262 Denmark,263 
Germany,264 and Poland,265 to name but a few, extend jurisdiction to all forms of bribery 
committed abroad and do not limit application of their laws to bribes paid in furtherance of 
business. 
 The laws of the United Kingdom merit special mention.  The United Kingdom suffered a 
great deal of embarrassment for its failure to pursue bribes paid abroad by the British defense 
company BAE.266  In response, the United Kingdom enacted the ambitious Bribery Act of 2010, 
which entered into force in the summer of 2011.267  The Bribery Act, as is true of many 
countries’ laws, “reaches more conduct” than the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.268  The Bribery 
Act, for example, not only prohibits the payment of bribes to foreign officials, but it also imposes 
strict liability for failure to prevent bribes.269  It extends jurisdiction not only to British nationals 
and businesses, but also to acts of bribery that have a “close connection” to the United Kingdom, 
which might include market effect.270  Joseph Warin, Charles Falconer, and Michael S. Diamant 
note that the jurisdictional reach combined with the strict liability provisions “could have a 
profound impact on multinational corporations.”271 
 Most importantly, however, the United Kingdom has committed itself to pursuing bribe 
payers and prosecuting them with this law.272  The United States has demonstrated a similar 
commitment.  Law enforcement officials in the United States have described prosecution of 
transnational bribery laws as “a national-security imperative” second only to antiterrorism laws 
as an enforcement priority.273  Prosecutions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act have 
increased exponentially, and many predict an even greater increase in prosecution of 
nonnationals.274  The United Kingdom and United States are not alone.  “By any calculation, 
262 See TRESTNÍ ZÁKON [Criminal Code] no. 140/1961 Sb., § 161 (Czech). 
263 See CRIM. CODE § 122 (Den.). 
264 See STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL. I] 945, as 
amended,  § 334 (Ger.).  Germany applies the same criminal provision to both domestic and transnational bribery.  
See Gesetz zur Bekampfund internationaler Bestechung [IntBestG] [Act on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions], Sept. 10, 1998, BGBL. 1998 S. 2327, art. 2, § 1 (Ger.),  translation 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/3/2377209.pdf. 
265 See PENAL CODE art. 229.5 (Pol.). 
266 See Jacqueline L. Bonneau, Note, Combating Foreign Bribery: Legislative Reform in the United Kingdom and 
Prospects for Increased Global Enforcement, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 365, 374–75 (2011) (describing failed 
investigation and international condemnation). 
267 Bribery Act, 2010, C. 23 (U.K.). 
268 Bonneau, supra note 266, at 389. 
269 See Bribery Act § 7. 
270 Id. § 12. 
271 F. Joseph Warin et al., The British Are Coming!: Britain Changes Its Law on Foreign Bribery and Joins the 
International Fight Against Corruption, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 16 (2010). 
272 Bonneau, supra note 266, at 392; Koehler, supra note 241, at 415–16. 
273 Grimm, supra note 141, at 249. 
274 E.g., Priya Cherian Huskins, FCPA Prosecutions: Liability Trend to Watch, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1149–52 
(2008); Koehler, supra note 241, at 416–17. 
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international anti-bribery enforcement is increasing worldwide, as more countries move slowly 
from enacting anti-bribery laws to initiating actions to identify and prosecute the individuals and 
companies who break them.”275 
 The global trend toward vigorous enforcement of antibribery laws brings with it the 
possibility of overlapping jurisdiction.276  A hypothetical U.S national working for a 
manufacturing branch located in China of a Singaporean and German joint venture with a 
significant market presence in Britain who paid a bribe to an Indonesian government official 
while at a meeting in South Korea would be subject to liability under each of the criminal laws of 
Germany, Indonesia, the People’s Republic of China, Singapore, South Korea, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.  If she tried to flee on Icelandic Airlines she would be subject to 
arrest and prosecution during the layover in Reykjavik.  Wherever she went in the world, she 
would be subject to prosecution by Hungary.  This hypothetical is designed to illustrate the 
potential for extensive overlap, but it is far from fanciful.  Stephen Kobrin, among others, writes 
of the post-Westphalian business reality, in which businesses form multiple chains of 
relationships with little regard for political borders.277  A firm that pays a bribe is subject to 
punishment by each of the states that can claim jurisdiction over that act, and those claims may 
be plentiful.  When considering the consequences of paying a bribe, a firm must include the 
possibility of multiple criminal prosecutions. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The rules regarding bribery are clear at both the macro and the micro levels:  individuals and 
firms may not pay bribes. Scholars have also examined the consequences of bribery at the macro 
level, and that research has been marshaled together in a comprehensive manner:  the 
consequences can be devastating. However, although empirical and theoretical research has been 
conducted at the micro level, that research has not been marshaled together in the same way. The 
lack of a comprehensive overview of the firm- and individual-level consequences of paying 
bribes perhaps contributes to the continued payment of bribes by firms even though the rules 
clearly prohibit those bribes. The failure of scholarship to discuss the consequences at the micro 
level could also be interpreted as the failure to state a business case for not paying bribes. 
 This article provides a comprehensive overview of the likely or potential outcomes that 
flow from paying bribes. The payment of bribes initiates a dynamic relationship between the 
bribe payer and a bureaucracy. That relationship, as well as the bribe itself, engenders 
consequences. In general, the payment of bribes increases the costs borne by a firm and increases 
the amount of time that firm will spend interacting with bureaucracies. The firm is likely to 
275 TRACE INT’L, GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT REPORT 2010, 2 (2010), available at 
https://secure.traceinternational.org/data/public/documents/GlobalEnforcementReport9.2010-64572-1.pdf. 
276 Neal Katyal suggests that this type of overlapping jurisdiction makes it more difficult for a wealthy corrupt actor 
to subvert justice through bribery.  Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1379 n.266 (2003). 
277 See Stephen J. Kobrin, Globalization, Transnational Corporations and the Future of Global Governance, in 
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON GLOBAL CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 249, 253-64 (Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido 
Palazzo eds., 2008) (describing a transition to a transnational rather than international economy and the dissonance 
caused by the lack of transnational governance mechanisms); see also William Twining, Essay, A Post-Westphalian 
Conception of Law, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 199, 199 (2003) (describing the complex interplay of legal systems not 
captured by a Westphalian orientation). 
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experience lower rates of growth and lower productivity than firms that do not pay bribes. The 
firm that pays bribes will be debarred from participating in a number of lucrative projects and 
will not be able to enter into beneficial relationships with transnational actors. Individuals in the 
firm, as well as the firm itself, expose themselves to criminal prosecution, fines, and 
imprisonment. The expansive international legal regime increases the likelihood that the bribe-
payer has violated multiple laws and bears potential liability in multiple jurisdictions. 
 From a scholarly perspective, the research on consequences at the micro level 
complements the research on consequences at the macro level.  Bribery imposes costs on the 
firm or the individual and degrades relationships in which that firm or individual is involved.  
From the perspective of an actual business or businessperson, the research as a whole presents a 
strong business case for complying with rules that prohibit the payment of bribes and for 
developing programs and policies that ensure compliance with laws prohibiting the payment of 
bribes.  Firms that develop and implement such programs and thereby avoid paying bribes 
should also avoid the costs imposed by the payment of bribes and enjoy an advantage over firms 
that continue to pay bribes. 
 
 
